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Introduction
Inward FDI should stabilize domestic income
fluctuations and help investment risks in the
domestic economy to disperse, at the same
time enabling access to modern technology
and financial sector development [8]. Thus they
support a typical classical argument for
international capital flows liberalization.
There are several studies showing the
effects of FDI in different host countries. The
earliest studies are showing the positive effects
of foreign ownership on productivity in
a domestic firm [2], [1]. The same conclusions
were later drawn also by some other authors
[11], [3]. Other studies show that FDI affect the
development potential of the economy as well
as reduce unemployment, affect transfer of
new technologies and knowledge, generate
additional tax revenue for the state, support
development strategies of individual sectors,
affect the development of managerial knowledge,
increase engagement of local companies in
supplier and subcontractor networks and gene-
rate a better utilisation of the local infrastructure
and service activities [15], [5].
The benefits of FDI are not self-evident and
greatly differ among different countries. The
benefits from FDI are enhanced in an open
investment environment with a democratic
trade and investment regime, active competition
policies, macroeconomic stability and privatisation
and deregulation. The distribution of positive
compared to the negative effects depends on
the economic policy towards these processes
and the entrepreneurial environment as well as
other factors affecting their consequences [9]. It
also often happens that positive effects of these
transactions usually occur with a time lag [16].
On the other hand it is important to know,
that with unfavourable conditions negative
effects of FDI are often. These are especially
evident in the form of reducing productivity of
the host country, reducing employment,
diminished R&D intensity, increased concentration
in the domestic market and the closing of
companies, shrinking of the domestic stock
market because shares are being transferred to
a foreign stock market, anti-competitive reactions
of the acquired firms, abnormally low sales
prices of companies or eliminated competition
in the domestic market [18], [19]. In recent
years, negative effects often include also
threats to national sovereignty and autonomy of
the host country and thus losing control of
strategic industries, whereby the threat of
losing economic independence is especially
emphasised [9].
In order to minimize these effects [22]
requires cautious economic policy with adjustment
of institutional settings and especially competition
policy. Real national economic policies
therefore often tend to distinguish between
greenfield investment and C-B M&A within FDI:
better accepted than C-B M&A, greenfield FDI
should enable new production, employment
and technology. On the other hand, C-B
M&A are less stable due to greater mobility of
this form of FDI and can include opportunistic
capital movements. Although differences
between these two forms of FDI diminish in the
long term, C-B M&A should bring the following
risks to macroeconomic developments:
 Unlike with greenfield investment, with C-B
M&A a foreign corporation may buy a local
company in order to exclude a competitor in
an important market;
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 If it holds a sufficient market share, foreign
affiliate with an intention described above
may seriously harm competition in the
entire domestic market;
 New owners from abroad not involved in
domestic environment issues may
unproportionally exercise cost reduction
thus causing degradation of the acquired
company;
 The takeover of the domestic firm may take
place in a period of financial crisis or in
other circumstances unfavorable to the
domestic company, thus the selling price
achieved may be too low in comparison to
the company’s real value;
 In the case when the subject to a bid is
a large company stock markets may shrink
as through the C-B M&A deal shares have
been collected from the domestic public
[17].
In 1987, 90% of all inward C-B M&A were
realized in industrial countries. Owing to their
stronger and stronger incorporation into world
trade and capital mobility in the 1990s
developing and transition countries became
more and more important locations for inward
C-B M&A and in 2012 they reached almost
23% of global C-B M&A flows [20]. Despite their
relatively higher level of capital saturation
compared with developing and transition
countries, developed countries retain their
dominant position in world C-B M&A also as
host countries. After they stabilized on 80% of
global inward C-B M&A level towards the end of
last decade and losing some pace in 2010 and
2011 (about 75%) the last accessible data 2012
demonstrated their even stronger lead (84%).
When taking an example of the EU developed
countries such developments are in
accordance with expectations basing on better
state of their economies regarding stock market
capitalization, value addition and the condition
of the regulatory and financial institutional
setting [16]. Apart from the fact that developed
countries are retaining their leading position in
EU economy one should, however, note that
dimension (consolidation of industries) and
dynamics of C-B M&A transactions have
progressively earned structural character in
their economies. As proven in several analyses
traditional leaders of trade and international
capital transactions are more and more
experiencing the impact of C-B M&A on their
economic goals (employment, balance of
payments, industrial structure) [10], [12]. These
developments bring new experience to the EU
developed countries’ governments: they are
often put into position when their national
economic policy makers seem to lose the
control over economic goals and especially
nationally important or strategic companies or
even industries. The above facts support the
expectations that the liberalization of
international capital mobility within the EU adds
to the concerns of national governments. So it
is no surprise that it took long lasting process to
come to a minimum agreement of international
capital mobility rules in the EU common market.
Before it was adopted in 2004 it took member
countries about 17 years to meet a minimum
agreement formalized by the Directive on
Takeover bids. Although being formalized in the
form of Directive the rules did not prove
sustainable from the very beginning and so
European capital market in the years after 2004
experienced considerable national economic
policy interventions expressing short term view
on economic goals fulfillment. 
In this article authors discuss the issue of
C-B M&A from the point of the lesson that the
European evidence could represent to
economic policy of an economy, which is
shaping its cohabitation in the EU and is eager
to steer its economic policy towards reducing
its gap towards developed EU industrial
countries. It starts with presentation of some of
the most known cases of interventionism in
Europe after the adoption of EC Directive on
takeover bids in 2004. After brief presentation
of the results of the Takeover Directive in the
first chapter, in the second chapter authors
present results of a study measuring economic
effects of inward C-B M&A in Europe. By
combining the data about economic effects
from the study with the data of investment
freedom as prepared by Heritage Foundation in
2009 and 2014, authors analyse if strategic
sectors benefit from incoming C-B M&A when
subject to the previous market oriented
industrial policy. The last chapter brings
conclusions.
1. Empirical Phenomena
Although liberalization of international capital
flows was formally legalized in the EU with the
Treaty of Maastricht in 1994, the most relevant
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for C-B M&A within the EU is the Directive
2004/25/EC of the European Parliament, and of
the Council on Takeover Bids (2004). Despite
the fact that the years preceding 2004 were
marked by dynamic integration processes
between European states, it took 17 years (!)
until the text of the directive was acceptable
enough so as to be adopted by the EU member
states. This is the consequence of the fact that
the member states wanted to keep the right to
individually define mechanisms for protecting
important domestic companies from takeovers
after implementing the new EU legislative [6].
Soon after legalization in 2004 the takeover
Directive already triggered the concern of
European national governments that their national
industrial policy supporting other economic
goals would be out of control. Foreign spectators
warned that the attitude of real economic policy
of European governments demonstrated
economic nationalism. According to [14] “There
is a neo-nationalism in Europe... they don't
even believe in their own project. They say they
want a big market for capital and goods, but
when it doesn't go well, they resort to neo-
protectionism.” The attitude of the EU
governments came out to be the protection of
“national champions” – an expression was
assigned to the French Prime Minister De
Villepin (2005–2007), who deliberately acted
against foreign companies’ bids for some
important French companies. So he prevented
an Italian bid for the French water and energy
company Suez, and an American bid for the
French food empire Danone.
Also, other European countries in the
period between 2005 and 2006 offered typical
examples of reviving economic nationalism.
German chancellor Angela Merkel personally
prevented the bid of Russia Sistema for a share
in the national telephone service provider
Deutsche Telekom. In Italy the bid for
a takeover of highway company Autostrade by
Spanish Albertis was disabled. In Spain,
accompanied by political arguing, the takeover
of electric company Endesa by German E.ON
was brought to a halt. In Italy an attempt for
considerable foreign investment into national
telephone service provider Telecom Italia by
American AT&T and Mexican America Movil
was stopped due to internal political
disagreement. Some studies are presenting the
concrete cases on interventionism of individual
countries and clearly show the defence policy
of developed host countries when dealing with
C-B M&As in strategic industries [13].
The engagement of most important European
economies in these processes, however,
differed substantially. According to the IMF in
2006 FDI represented about 13% of GDP in
Italy, 25% in Germany, 36% in Britain, and 42%
in France. These figures obviously explain why
the French government seems to be the most
active with protecting their “national champions.”
On the other hand, however, a lack of such
striking examples from Britain despite relatively
high share of FDI if compared to their GDP,
characterizes the typical Anglo-Saxon attitude
of an open economy.
When judging the actions of EU member
states’ governments, however, one should note
that after the adoption of the EU Directive on
takeover bids obviously the era of fast growth of
inward FDI in the EU has started. So with
respect to 2004 and 2005 the growth of FDI as
a percentage of gross fixed capital formation in
the EU was 125%, while in the same period it
grew in developed countries of the world for
41%. Also, in the top 50 pairs of countries with
the largest bilateral inward stock, in 2005 22
were from Europe, compared to 17 in 1995
[19]. Considering this and adding quite a high
ranking of employment goals and state-
supported social cohesion in continental
Europe, we should not be surprised that
reactions previously described came from
ruling parties – coalitions regardless their
political orientation.
After eight years of its application the EU
Commission analysed the effects of takeover
Directive (2012). According to the analysis the
Directive did not led to major changes in the
member states legislative – allegedly also
because of the fact that changes in member
countries framework have already been in
process in the time of the Directive adoption. As
to the transposing of the whole Directive the
actions of member states differ quite a lot.
While the board neutrality rule (“prevents any
action by the company, which could frustrate
the bidder without authorization by the general
shareholder meeting”) was adopted by 19
member states, only three of them transposed
the breakthrough rule (“neutralizes the pre-bid
defenses during the takeover by making them
inoperable during the takeover period) and half
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of the states allow the home companies who
are subject to a foreign bid, not to apply the two
rules mentioned, when the foreign offer or is not
subject to the same rule – reciprocity.
Nevertheless the analysis states that the
shareholders in general believe that the
Directive made a difference in the field of
coordination that it has strengthened the
position of minority shareholders and it improved
the disclosure regime. Relevant for the political
market exchange and thus influencing
economic policy practice is the reluctance
towards the Directive by the representatives of
employees, stating that the document does not
sufficiently protect employees against changing
conditions and layoffs after the takeover. In this
way the analysis of the Directive
implementation points to the fact that the
choice of national policies to intervene in the
field of intra EU capital movements still exists.
2. Empirical Study on
Consequences of the Directive
2.1 The Data, Sample and Method
The research presented in this article is based
on the analysis of the relationship between
economic effects of C-B M&A and Heritage
Foundation Index of Investment Freedom. An
international study of C-B M&A’s economic
effects at the national level was carried out
using the method of total analysis. It
deliberately considers answers from a survey
carried out in chosen academic communities in
2009 because five years after the adoption of
Takeover Directive the estimates from academic
community were considered to be the most
realistic. In the research we presupposed that
academic view on economic effects of inward
C-B M&A in their home country would stay
relevant for at least mid-term period, here
meaning 5–10 years, as one of the academics’
mission is to retain robust position with current
issues of economic policy. The research was
carried out through estimation of two equations.
With the first one the relationship between
results of a study 2009 (especially government
intervention and economic position of strategic
sectors) and Index of Investment Freedom for
2009 and with the second one the relationship
between results of a study 2009 and the same
Index for 2014 was tested.
Respondents in the survey from 2009 were
professionals from business schools, who in
one way or another are following real practice
in the field in their home countries. In our
research, we considered the respondents’ view
as typical and respectively representative for
the country in which business school is located.
This could include the risk of a personal bias.
However, the respondents were invited to
participate by individual schools’ deans according
to their field of research and teaching. As a rule
they were in one way or another actively
involved in the field of C-B M&A in their
countries, or were at least well-acquainted with
professional or public discussion on the matter
in local circles and in the media.
In this way the quality of answers does not
lag behind the quality of answers obtained in
other known studies using a similar
methodology. One that should be mentioned is
the analysis of public sentiment with Norway
bank takeover by analyzing printed media [21].
The methodology used is to a certain extent
comparable with the study of European Group
for Investor Protection [4], where answers are
obtained by interviewing government officials in
individual states, and with the study of Global
Financial Communication Network [7] where
authors rely on the opinion of editors and top
journalists on C-B M&A effects. Considering
the types of involvement of respondents in our
study, one could rate the method used less
prone to political or popular bias.
The study 2009 was carried out with the
help of a questionnaire consisting of 21 questions
in the fields of macroeconomic and
microeconomic effects of inward C-B M&A in
European economies.
The sample included 109 business schools
from the following 36 countries (the number of
respondents is in parentheses): Austria (4),
Belarus (2), Belgium (2), Bosnia and Herze-
govina (2), Bulgaria (2), Croatia (4), Cyprus (2),
Czech Republic (4), Denmark (2), Estonia (2),
Finland (2), France (2), Germany (3), Georgia (2),
Greece (2), Hungary (4), Ireland (2), Italy (3),
Island (2), Latvia (3), Lithuania (6), Netherlands
(2), Norway (2), Poland (4), Portugal (2),
Romania (4), Russia (4), Slovakia (3), Slovenia
(4), Spain (5), Serbia and Montenegro (2),
Sweden (2), Switzerland (2), Turkey (4), UK (3)
and Ukraine (4). In most parts of this research,
we divided these countries into two groups:
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developed countries and transition countries.
As developed countries we have considered
old EU members before 2004 EU enlargement,
Island, Norway and Switzerland plus Turkey.
Although there are considerable differences
among them, these countries have been
experiencing western type of democracy,
market economy and private ownership. They
are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Island,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey and UK. On the other side
as transition countries considered are European
countries and Russia, who after World War II
shared state ownership, central planning and
mono-party system. We presupposed that
these heritages should define a different need
for privatization, to replace obsolete capacities
in manufacturing and to develop markets and
hierarchies typical for a market economy – all
being normal consequences of inward C-B
M&As. The countries representing this group
are: Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia plus Serbia and
Montenegro.
For statistical analysis the program SPSS-X
for Windows and Microsoft Excel were used.
By using linear regression the compatibility of
the results from the questionnaire was as already
mentioned tested with Index of Economic
Freedom as a part of Index of Economic
Freedom by the Heritage Foundation (for years
2009 and 2014). The results of the study were
considered compatible to the index mentioned
above as the equation coefficients were
statistically significant.
2.2 Main Results about Economic
Effects
The statistical source related to macro-
economic consequences consists of eight sets
of questions referring to benefits and threats
that inward C-B M&A caused in receiving
economies.
When benefits are concerned, the
strongest statistical significance was in both
groups of countries assigned to market access
and know-how, followed by technology transfer.
Respondents in transition countries stressed –
relative to those from developed countries –
stronger pressure of international investors on
national economic policy. The most important
threats to transition countries were the
crowding-out of domestic companies by foreign
bidders and insufficient price achieved for sold
domestic companies. Those two threats were
also quite strongly present in developed
countries, however with substantially lower
importance relative to transition economies.
An analysis of microeconomic effects shows
divergent results for both groups of countries to
a certain extent. For developed countries the
biggest benefit of C-B M&A proved to be the
consolidation of strategic sectors, while the
reduction of domestic firms’ capital was on the
top on the list as a threat. In transition countries
the consolidation of strategic sectors was also
considered on the top of benefits, while as the
top threat informal pressure of foreign investors
on market conditions. This effect of C-B
M&A registered in developed countries quite
a low value. The less present effect in both
groups of countries here was contraction and
the closing of R&D departments of firms
acquired from foreign companies. Among
microeconomic effects also the forms of
acculturation with inward C-B M&A were
analyzed. With 62% (transition countries) and
67% (developed countries) the biggest weight
was assigned to integration as a form of
acculturation. Readiness for assimilation in
transition countries (36% vs. 29%) was
expectedly higher than in industrial countries,
while separation was quoted as an exception in
both groups of countries.
In general, the obtained results of the study
enable us to conclude that despite differences
between both groups of economies with inward
FDI in the form of C-B M&A in 2009 mostly
positive effects in both countries were present.
These findings diverge from real policies of
industrial states described above.
Theory and own research in this way lead
to the conclusion that when subject to
consistent marked founded industrial policy the
strategic sectors should benefit from C-B
M&A as these transactions would help industry
consolidation. Unlike rational industrial policy
that would through supporting market
adjustment strengthen strategic sectors, rather
mercantilist state sheltering of these sectors
would lead to unwanted sensibility. We tested
this thesis and are presenting the results below.
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2.3 Is Protectionism Serving
Nationally Important
Companies?
For testing the relationship between consistent
market adjusted industrial policy and the C-B
M&As' effects on strategic sectors, we exposed
the results of the 2009 study to the Heritage
Foundation Index of Economic Freedom –
Index of Investment Freedom (IIF) for the same
economies in the same year. Following the mid-
term character of the data collected with the
questionnaire for the study 2009 we took the
latest IIF indicators for the year 2014 and
included them in to the equation together with
the indicators of economic effects of C-B M&As
as estimated by the academics interviewed five
years ago. In this way the statistical and
analytical quality of the first equation which
should provide us with stylized facts was
proved. For the subjects of economic policy in
European countries – and especial transition
ones confirmation of the article thesis would be
of help when judging political decisions with
their industrial policy.
As already mentioned we first started with
the analysis using the IIF for 2009. Our expec-
tation was that less frequent the intervention of
governments in the C-B M&A processes in
order to protect the domestic economy and
shareholders cause an increase in the free flow
of investment. Therefore the model in the form:
(1)
was expected. The following variables were
included in the model:
 INDEXIIF(2009) – Index of Investment
freedom for chosen economies in 2009;
 GI – government intervention in the C-B
M&A processes in order to protect the
domestic economy and shareholders;
 SE – Strengthening of the economic
position of strategic sectors as a consequence
of C-B M&A
The scatter plots indicated a good linear
relationship between INDEXIIF and GI plus SE.
So as to estimate a linear regression equation
we carried out econometrical tests using
variables provided by the study 2009 together
with INDEXIIF. The results are organized in the
following three tables. Table 1 below shows the
multiple linear regression model summary and
overall fit statistics.
Tab. 1: Multiple linear regression summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted R Std. Error of the 
Durbin-WatsonSquare Estimate
1 .493(a) .243 .194 .15586 2.170
Source: own
Table 1 brings multiple linear regression
summary. The adjusted R2 in our model was
0.194 with the R2 = 0.243. Thus, the linear
regression explains 24.3% of the variance in
the data. The Durbin-Watson test d = 2.170
was between the two critical values of 1.5 < d <
2.5, and therefore it can be assumed that there
was no first order linear autocorrelation in our
multiple linear regression data.
Table 2 shows the results of ANOVA F-test.
Tab. 2: ANOVA F-test
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression .241 2 .121 4.968 .013(b)
Residual .753 31 .024
Total .994 33
Source: own
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The ANOVA F-test in Table 2 includes the
null hypothesis that there is no linear
relationship between the variables. F-test is
highly significant (the P-value for the F test
statistic is less than 0.05, thus providing strong
evidence against the null hypothesis). In this
way we can assume that a linear relationship
between the variables in our model exists.
Table 3 shows coefficients of linear regression.
Tab. 3: Coefficients
Unstandard. Coefficients
Standard. 
Collinearity Statistics
Model Coeffic. t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 Constant .630 .128 4.908 .000
GI -.067 .027 -.382 -2.446 .020 .999 1.001
SE .067 .033 .323 2.065 .047 .999 1.001
a Predictors: (Constant), GI,SE
b Dependent Variable: INDEXIIF(2009) Source: own
Beta coefficients from the Table 3 express
the relative importance of each independent
variable in standardized form. We found that GI
and SE are significant predictors and that GI
has a higher impact on the INDEXIIF(2009) than
SE (beta = -0.382 and beta = 0.323). In the
Table 3 also a multicollinearity test for our
model is presented. As the tolerance should be
> 0.1 (or VIF statistics should be < 10) for all
included variables, this requirement was
fulfilled with achieved VIF values 1.00.
The coefficients obtained above give the
following equation:
(2)
Equation (2) shows that less frequent the
intervention of governments in the C-B
M&A processes in order to protect the domestic
economy and shareholders cause an increase
in the free flow of investment. On the other
hand, strengthening of the economic position of
strategic sectors as a consequence of C-B
M&A, increases the value of INDEXIIF(2009).
According to these results the best solution for
strategic enterprises should be to enable them to
open to the international economic environment.
The second step of our research was
testing the results of the study with the IIF
2014. The main aim of this step was to check
whether judgments of the academic community
to which mid-term relevance was ascribed
could be considered relevant also after five
years following the real experience as basis of
their judgement. The thesis here was the same
is it was for IIF 2009. We expected that values
of descriptors in the linear equation will not
differ essentially from the ones in 2009.
Below we present the main results and
respectively descriptive statistics for the
equation for the IIF data for 2014. Table 4
presents model summary.
Tab. 4: Model summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted Std. Error of the 
Durbin-Watson
R Square Estimate
1 .541(a) .292 .247 .15859 1.920
Source: own 
The determination coefficient R2 = 0.292
from Table 4 shows that the linear regression
explains 29.2% of the variance in the data. The
value of the Durbin-Watson test is 1.920, so
there is no first order linear autocorrelation in
our multiple linear regression data. The results from
ANOVA F-test are presented in the Table 5.
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ANOVA F-test from Table 5 is highly
significant (F=6.404, P=0.005), thus we can
assume that there is a linear relationship
between IG, SE, and INDEXIIF(2014). In Table 6
coefficients for regression are presented.
Tab. 5: ANOVA F-test
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression .322 2 .161 6.404 .005(a)
Residual .780 31 .025
Total 1.102 33
Source: own 
Tab. 6: Coefficients
Unstandard. Coefficients
Standard. 
Collinearity Statistics
Model Coeffic. t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 Constant .620 .131 4.747 .000
GI -.064 .028 -.351 -2.320 .027 .999 1.001
SE .093 .033 .423 2.796 .009 .999 1.001
a Predictors: (Constant), GI, SE
b Dependent Variable: INDEXIIF(2014) Source: own
In the Table 6 we see that IG and SE are
significant predictors. Values of VIF test proves
that no multicollinearty exists. Following these
results the equation including all previous
presented variables is:
(4)
Equation 4 supports the thesis presented
above. It demonstrates that with less intervention
of governments in the C-B M&A the value of
Index of Investment Freedom is higher. At the
same time the higher value of index is
explained with improvement of strategic
sectors' economic position. Better value of the
index thus demonstrates better environment for
strategic sectors development. The significance
of the GI variable demonstrates economic
policy attitude towards protection of domestic
shareholders and companies in general. Here
as the matter of fact domestic and international
transactions cannot be distinguished and so
less discretionary economic policy approach
means less intervention also in the field of 
C-B M&A. This, however, supports the
conviction that national economic policy
reaction on inward C-B M&A flows also reflects
the economic freedom in a given economy.
Following to the fact that between the two
equations only irrelevant differences in
descriptors as well as with statistics appear, we
can conclude that the (explanatory) variables
obtained through 2009 study approach are
relevant and that the thesis could be confirmed
even after almost five year time span.
This could be therefore of use for
consideration by the national governments
especially in European transition and pre-
accession countries.
Conclusions
Although most of studies prove positive effects
of C-B M&A we should be aware that these
processes, when big enough, may influence
economic goals of a country. With typically
interventionist style of economic policy in
biggest continental EU economies (Germany,
France, Italy, Spain) the FDI often proves to be
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a source of disharmony between government
and businesses.
The revival of interventionism (including
elements of economic nationalism) in Europe
might have been triggered by the liberalization
of international capital flows after adopting the
EU Directive on takeover bids in 2004. Activist
reaction of the most important EU governments
except for Great Britain in this way actually
demonstrated that when goals of economic
growth and employment are concerned, they
rely rather to their control over nationally
important sectors and companies than to the
opening of the economy.
Our study on inward Cc-B M&A in Europe
proves that the interested (academic)
community has judged benefits and threats of
C-B M&A much less critical than real economic
policy. In order to prove which standing is
closer to the facts, an additional analysis by
introducing existing international FDI indicators
was carried out. By using models, where our
results were combined with the Index of
Investment Freedom (Heritage Foundation), we
carried out linear regression.
With the first equation the relationship
between results of a study 2009 and Index of
Investment Freedom for 2009 and with the
second one the relationship between results of
a study and the same Index for 2014 was
tested. As academics’ mission is also to retain
robust position with current issues of economic
policy we presupposed in the research that
their view on economic effects of inward C-B
M&A in their home country would stay relevant
for at least mid-term period, here meaning 5–10
years.
The obtained equations for both periods
were almost identical. As despite the financial
and economic crisis the IIF was not subject to
notable changes it enables us to conclude that
nothing significant also happened in the field of
the C-B M&A economic effects for the host
economies, that would trigger economic policy
protectionist action. Of course this again would
be offset in the individual countries’ IIF value,
which did not happen.
We can conclude that according to our
research C-B M&A should promote a consolidation
of strategic sectors, thus suggesting that the
openness of countries has positive consequences
for the development of these sectors. So
basing on these results we can assume that
once, establishing themselves as strategic
sectors and companies – the latter gains on
economic strength when involved in free
international capital flows and when
government intervention for their protection and
for protection of their shareholders is reduced.
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Abstract
DOES ECONOMIC INTERVENTIONISM HELP STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES?
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE
Anita Maãek, Rasto Ovin
Although most studies proves that Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions (C-B M&A) cause more
benefits than threats, the real economic policy in the EU countries offsets the fear that liberalization
of inward C-B M&A would endanger economic position of strategic industries and thus national
economic goals.
After the adoption of EU Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids the era of fast growth of
inward C-B M&A in the EU and consequently the era of rising interventionism so as to protect
national strategic industries and companies has started. Additional stimulus for the European
Union’s (EU) most developed economies to exercise interventionism was financial and economic
crisis starting in 2008. Considering high ranking of employment goals and state-supported social
cohesion in continental Europe, it is not surprise that interventionist reactions came from ruling
parties and coalitions regardless their political orientation.
By the help of the results of their 2009 empirical study on C-B M&A authors tested the relation
between the results referring to C-B M&A effects on strategic sectors and the Heritage Foundation
Index of Investment Freedom. With combining the results from 2009 study with Index of Investment
Freedom from 2009 and in the second equation with index from 2014 authors checked if strategic
sectors benefit from incoming C-B M&A when subject to the previous market oriented industrial
policy.
Both estimated equations proves that unlike with sheltering economic policy, when subject to
market conform measures of industrial policy, strategic sectors will benefit from inward C-B M&A.
By proving the statistical significant relationship between the results from 2009 study and Index
from 2014 authors also proved the statistical and analytical quality of the equation from 2009. By
proving statistical significance of the second equation we proved that the judgement of the
academic community could be considered relevant also after five years following the real
experience as basis of their judgement.
Key Words: Cross-border mergers and acquisitions, economic interventionism, strategic
industries.
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